When and what wholesale and retail prices should be set in multi-channel supply chains?
When and what wholesale and retail prices should be set in multi-channel supply chains?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.069
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发表时间：
2018-06-01
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Matsui, Kenji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Matsui, Kenji
本文研究了多渠道供应链中批发和零售价格的最优时机和水平，其中制造商生产和销售产品给零售商，零售商竞争转售产品，通过应用非合作博弈论中设计的可观察延迟博弈的框架。本文假设一个制造商和两个零售商组成一个两级供应链，他们不仅可以选择批发价格和零售价格，还可以选择定价的时机。我们的分析组成的离散时期的动态博弈提供了两个有用的结论，为作战决策支持。首先，制造商必须同时为同时出售给不同零售商的产品设定批发价格。第二，与制造商同时定价相反，零售商必须在不同的时间顺序地制定各自的零售价格，因此，零售商应该错开制定零售价格的时间。我们正式证明，这些时间的定价决策的制造商和零售商构成一个子博弈完美纳什均衡的动态非合作博弈的三个供应链各方。因此，这些结论可以作为供应链成员选择最佳定价时机的实际指导。(C)2017作者（S）由爱思唯尔公司出版
This paper investigates the optimal timing and level of wholesale and retail prices set in multi-channel supply chains, where a manufacturer produces and sells products to retailers that compete to resell the products, by applying the framework of an observable delay game devised in noncooperative game theory. We assume that one manufacturer and two retailers, which constitute a two-echelon supply chain, can select not only the levels of wholesale and retail prices, respectively, but also the timing of pricing. Our analysis of a dynamic game composed of discrete periods provides two useful conclusions for operational decision support. First, the manufacturer must simultaneously set its wholesale prices for products that are sold to separate retailers at the same time. Second, in contrast to the simultaneous price setting by the manufacturer, the retailers must sequentially set respective retail prices at different times; thus, the retailers should stagger their timings for setting retail prices. We formally demonstrate that these timings of pricing decisions by the manufacturer and the retailers constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the dynamic noncooperative game played by the three supply chain parties. Consequently, these conclusions can be used as practical guidelines for supply chain members choosing optimal timing of pricing. (C) 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.