Competition for access provision: Infrastructure upgrades with spillovers
Competition for access provision: Infrastructure upgrades with spillovers
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Noriaki Matsushima;Keizo Mizuno
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作者：
Noriaki Matsushima;Keizo Mizuno
我们研究了一个游戏的竞争与接入提供服务质量是内生地决定通过基础设施升级溢出。在自由竞争制度中有两种均衡。特别是，无论溢出程度和投资成本如何，自愿提供接入费高于接入成本的情况都是在均衡状态下发生的。但是，当溢出程度较小时，投资成本较低时，止赎也会在均衡状态下发生。我们还表明，当自愿准入发生在均衡，准入管制是社会可取的，只有当溢出的程度是小的，投资成本高。相反，在更广泛的投资成本范围内，在止赎比自愿准入规定下，准入监管是社会可取的。
We examine a game of competition with access provision in which service quality is endogenously determined through infrastructure upgrades with spillovers. There are two types of equilibria in the free competition regime. In particular, voluntary access provision with an access charge higher than access cost occurs in equilibrium, irrespective of the degree of spillover and the investment cost. However, foreclosure also occurs in equilibrium when the degree of spillover is small and the investment cost is low. We also show that, when voluntary access provision occurs in equilibrium, access regulation is socially desirable only if the degree of spillover is small and the investment cost is high. On the contrary, access regulation is socially desirable in the broader range of investment cost under foreclosure than under voluntary access provision.