Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy
Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy
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随机匹配经济中的动态货币均衡
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0262.00315
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Ruilin Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Green;Ruilin Zhou
本文涉及无限视野经济，其中贸易必须使用双重拍卖机制成对发生，并且法定货币克服了需求双重巧合的缺乏。交易者都是匿名的，缺乏市场力量。商品是可分割且易腐烂的，并且在每个日期都会被消耗。偏好是由实用流超越定义的。金钱是可分割的，并且不受库存限制。个人和整个经济范围内的货币持有量分布的演变是有特征的。单一价格均衡存在一个福利有序的连续体，反映的是价格水平的不确定性，而不是相对价格的不确定性。
This article concerns an infinite horizon economy where trade must occur pairwise, using a double auction mechanism, and where fiat money overcomes lack of double coincidence of wants. Traders are anonymous and lack market power. Goods are divisible and perishable, and are consumed at every date. Preferences are defined by utility-stream overtaking. Money is divisible and not subject to inventory constraints. The evolution of individual and economywide money holdings distributions is characterized. There is a welfare-ordered continuum of single price equilibria, reflecting indeterminacy of the price level rather than of relative prices.