Coordination of supply chains with risk-averse agents
Coordination of supply chains with risk-averse agents
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2004.tb00150.x
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发表时间：
2004-06-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Yan, HM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gan, XH;Sethi, SP;Yan, HM
现有的供应链管理文献没有解决的问题，协调供应链涉及风险规避代理。我们采取了这个问题，并开始与定义一个协调的合同，结果在帕累托最优的解决方案，每个代理。我们的定义概括了风险中性情况下的标准定义。然后，我们开发协调合同在三个特定的情况下：（i）供应商是风险中性和零售商最大化他的预期利润受到下行风险约束;（ii）供应商和零售商都最大化自己的均值方差权衡;和（iii）供应商和零售商都最大化自己的预期效用。此外，在情况（iii）中，我们证明了我们的合同产生纳什谈判解。在每种情况下，我们展示了如何找到帕累托最优解集，然后设计一个合同来实现这些解。我们还展示了一种情况下，我们获得帕累托最优共享规则明确，并概述了一个程序，以获得帕累托最优的解决方案。
The extant supply chain management literature has not addressed the issue of coordination in supply chains involving risk-averse agents. We take up this issue and begin with defining a coordinating contract as one that results in a Pareto-optimal solution acceptable to each agent. Our definition generalizes the standard one in the risk-neutral case. We then develop coordinating contracts in three specific cases: (i) the supplier is risk neutral and the retailer maximizes his expected profit subject to a downside risk constraint; (ii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own mean-variance trade-off; and (iii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility. Moreover, in case (iii), we show that our contract yields the Nash Bargaining solution. In each case, we show how we can find the set of Pareto-optimal solutions, and then design a contract to achieve the solutions. We also exhibit a case in which we obtain Pareto-optimal sharing rules explicitly, and outline a procedure to obtain Pareto-optimal solutions.