Fairness and reflexivity in the Cyprus bail-in
Fairness and reflexivity in the Cyprus bail-in
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塞浦路斯内部纾困的公平性和反思性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Zenios
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Zenios
塞浦路斯债务危机提供了一些独特的教训。当与国际贷款人三巨头达成援助计划时，问题已经变得如此复杂，以至于实施了存款人纾困以维护金融稳定。纾困是欧元区首次采用的一种临时解决方案，但如今已成为应对未来银行业危机的蓝图。本文探讨了2013年3月两次欧元集团塞浦路斯会议前18个月的事件，以及该国两个系统性银行与储户纾困的解决和重组。我们展示了如何在处理危机的延误加剧了问题，但也带来了解决问题的工具有重大的意想不到的后果，符合反身性原则。现有证据质疑指导存款人减记政策决定的机密研究的有效性，并支持在塞浦路斯实施的纾困违反国际公平原则的论点。我们使用的分析，以吸取一些教训，对未来的危机使用纾困。
The Cyprus debt crisis provides some unique lessons. By the time an assistance program was agreed with the Troika of international lenders, the problem had become so complex that a depositor bail-in was implemented to safeguard financial stability. The bail-in was an ad hoc solution applied for the first time in the eurozone but is now the blueprint for dealing with future banking crises. This paper examines the events for the 18-month period before the two eurogroup meetings on Cyprus in March 2013, and the resolution and restructuring of the two systemic banks of the country with depositor bail-in. We show how delays in dealing with the crisis exacerbated the problem but also how the tools brought into solve the problem had significant unintended consequences that fit the reflexivity principle. Available evidence questions the validity of confidential studies guiding the policy decisions on depositor haircut and supports the argument that the bail-in, as implemented in Cyprus, violated international principles of fairness. We use the analysis to draw some lessons on the use of bail-in for future crises.