Policy instruments to control Amazon fires: A simulation approach
Policy instruments to control Amazon fires: A simulation approach
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控制亚马逊火灾的政策工具：模拟方法
DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.043
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
Morello T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Morello T
农业火灾是一把双刃剑，它使热带地区的土地管理具有成本效益，但也会导致意外火灾和碳和污染物的排放。为了控制亚马逊地区的火灾，目前还不清楚决策者是应该优先考虑命令和控制，还是像REDD +这样基于激励的工具。为了了解这两种政策方法的相对优点，本文提出了一个基于空间显性主体的模型，该模型模拟了四种政策工具对有意和无意火灾的因果影响。事实证明，所有工具都有效地推翻了高利润但危险的火使用的优势和减少意外火灾，但没有一个是完美的。事实证明，指挥和控制的表现对执法的空间和社会范围高度敏感。以奖励为基础的工具的副作用包括控制火灾的不成比例的增加和由于禁止不计后果的火灾和间接砍伐森林而导致的对保护补贴的接受程度降低。在减少森林砍伐方面最有效的工具在减少火灾方面并不最有效，反之亦然，这表明这两个目标不能通过单一的政策干预来实现。
Agricultural fires are a double-edged sword that allow for cost-efficient land management in the tropics but also cause accidental fires and emissions of carbon and pollutants. To control fires in Amazon, it is currently unclear whether policy-makers should prioritize command-and-control or incentive-based instruments such as REDD +. Aiming to generate knowledge about the relative merits of the two policy approaches, this paper presents a spatially-explicit agent-based model that simulates the causal effects of four policy instruments on intended and unintended fires. All instruments proved effective in overturning the predominance of highly profitable but risky fire-use and decreasing accidental fires, but none were free from imperfections. The performance of command-and-control proved highly sensitive to the spatial and social reach of enforcement. Side-effects of incentive-based instruments included a disproportionate increase in controlled fires and a reduced acceptance of conservation subsidies, caused by the prohibition of reckless fires, and also indirect deforestation. The instruments that were most effective in reducing deforestation were not the most effective in reducing fires and vice-versa, which suggests that the two goals cannot be achieved with a single policy intervention.