Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms
Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms
复制标题
私营企业间不对称的最优私有化政策
DOI：
10.1111/boer.12213
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Matsumura Toshihiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haraguchi Junichi;Matsumura Toshihiro
我们回顾了最优私有化政策与市场竞争指数之间的关系，如赫希曼-赫芬达尔指数。市场集中度受企业数量和企业规模不对称的影响，企业数量越少，企业间不对称程度越大，市场集中度指数越高。关于混合寡头垄断的文献表明，在所有私营企业都是同质的情况下，最优私有化程度随着私营企业数量的增加而增加，因此随着市场竞争指数的下降而减少。我们研究了私营企业之间的不对称如何影响最优私有化程度。我们提出了最简单、最自然的模型公式来讨论私营企业之间的不对称。我们发现，在民营企业之间不对称的情况下，最优私有化程度要么是非单调的，要么是单调增加的，因此永远不会单调减少。
We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. It is affected by the number of the firms and asymmetry among the sizes of the firms; the smaller the number of firms and the more asymmetry among firms, the higher the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggested that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms, and thus, decreases with the market competition index, assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation to discuss asymmetry among private firms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monotonically increasing, and thus never monotonically decreasing, in asymmetry among private firms.