INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE-CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE-ENTRY OLIGOPOLY
INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE-CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE-ENTRY OLIGOPOLY
复制标题
自由进入寡头垄断中雇员控制的公司进入不足
DOI：
10.1111/apce.12179
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
OKAMURA Makoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
HAMADA Kojun;OHKAWA Takao;OKAMURA Makoto
本研究从福利最大化的观点出发，对员工控制型企业（ECF）是否过度或不充分地进入自由进入的寡头垄断市场进行了理论分析。超额进入定理在寡头垄断理论中是众所周知的。根据这一定理，更多的利润最大化的公司进入自由进入寡头垄断市场比福利最大化的最佳。我们证明了当ECF在自由进入市场竞争时出现进入不足的可能性。特别是，我们表明，如果需求和成本函数都是凸的，不充分的ECF进入必然会发生。我们的研究结果表明，企业之间的竞争寻求利润以外的目的可能会导致不充分的进入，因为竞争企业的目标的差异影响市场竞争的强度。
This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.