Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach
Selling out or going public? A real options signaling approach
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出售还是上市？
DOI：
10.1016/j.frl.2017.04.003
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nishihara;M.
我们研究了一个动态模型，在这个模型中，一家公司在信息不对称的情况下选择出售还是上市。假设在信息对称的情况下，公司更愿意出售。在非对称信息下，我们有一个分离均衡，其中高增长公司上市较早，而低增长公司遵循第一最佳销售政策，因为高增长公司通过IPO向市场投资者发出信号。这一结果与经验证据是一致的。该模型还产生了关于信息不对称和现金流波动性对决策的影响。
We examine a dynamic model in which a firm chooses between selling out and going public under asymmetric information. Suppose that the firm prefers to sell out under symmetric information. Under asymmetric information, we have a separating equilibrium in which the high-growth firm goes public earlier while the low-growth firm follows the first-best sales policy because the high-growth firm signals to market investors by doing an IPO. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also yields implications about the effects of asymmetric information and cash flow volatility on the decisions.