Contracting to assure supply: How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
Contracting to assure supply: How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
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发表时间：
2001-05-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Lariviere, MA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Cachon, GP;Lariviere, MA
预测共享是在一个供应链与制造商，面临随机需求的单一产品和供应商，是唯一的来源，一个关键部件。以下事件顺序发生：制造商向供应商提供其初始预测沿着合同，供应商构建能力（如果他接受合同），制造商收到更新的预测并提交最终订单。两个合同遵守制度被认为是。如果供应商在强制遵守的情况下接受合同，那么他在能力选择方面几乎没有灵活性;然而，在自愿遵守的情况下，他保持了很大的灵活性。最佳供应链绩效要求制造商如实地分享其最初的预测，但她有动机夸大其预测，以诱导供应商建立更多的能力。供应商意识到这种偏差，因此可能不信任制造商的预测，从而损害供应链绩效。我们研究的合同，允许供应链共享需求预测下任一合规制度。
Forecast sharing is studied in a supply chain with a manufacturer that faces stochastic demand for a single product and a supplier that is the sole source for a critical component. The following sequence of events occurs: the manufacturer provides her initial forecast to the supplier along with a contract,the supplier constructs-capacity (if he accepts the Contract), the manufacturer receives an updated forecast and submits a final order. Two contract compliance regimes are considered. If the supplier accepts the contract under forced compliance then he has little flexibility with respect to his capacity choice; under voluntary compliance, however, he maintains substantial flexibility. Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her initial forecast truthfully, but she has an incentive to inflate her forecast to induce the supplier to build more capacity. The supplier is aware of this bias, and so may not trust the manufacturer's forecast, harming supply chain performance. We study contracts that allow the supply chain to share demand forecasts credibly under either compliance regime.