Side channel analysis attacks using AM demodulation on commercial smart cards with SEED
Side channel analysis attacks using AM demodulation on commercial smart cards with SEED
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jss.2012.06.063
复制
发表时间：
2012-12-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Park, IlHwan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kim, Tae Hyun;Kim, ChangKyun;Park, IlHwan
我们调查统计侧信道分析攻击的种子分组密码实现在两个商业智能卡在现实世界中使用的电子支付系统。第一个是接触式卡，第二个是组合卡。两种卡在算法级都没有掩蔽方案，并且组合卡仅支持硬件级的隐藏技术。我们的研究结果表明，一个不受保护的实现种子允许一个恢复的秘密密钥与低数量的电源或电磁痕迹。此外，本文清楚地证实，虽然隐藏对策，如随机电流和随机噪声可能会增加成功攻击所需的功率迹线的数量，但很难为自己提供足够的抵抗侧信道攻击的能力。我们相信，我们的研究成果也将有利于其他算法和商业智能卡的分析和保护。(C)2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
We investigate statistical side channel analysis attacks on the SEED block cipher implemented in two commercial smart cards used in a real-world electronic payment system. The first one is a contact-only card and the second one is a combination card. Both cards have no masking scheme at algorithm level and the combination card supports only hiding techniques in hardware level. Our results show that an unprotected implementation of SEED allows one to recover the secret key with low number of power or electromagnetic traces. Moreover, this paper clearly confirms that, although hiding countermeasures such as random current and random noise may increase the number of power traces needed for a successful attack, it is difficult to provide sufficient resistance to side channel attacks for itself. We believe that our results in this research will also be beneficial to the analysis and protection of other algorithms and commercial smart cards. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.