Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions
Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions
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政治解决方案和促进增长的机构的治理
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Mushtaq H Khan
中科院分区：
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作者：
Mushtaq H Khan
众所周知，由于各国的政治背景不同，各机构的运作方式也大不相同。人们还了解，这对设计不同国家的治理优先事项具有重要影响。本文发展了对“政治解决”的分析，为分析发展中国家的制度和治理提供了一个分析框架。这种分析的核心是对权力分配的理解。我们将其定义为争夺资源分配的不同群体和组织的相对控制力。掌握权力在一定程度上取决于收入和财富，但也取决于不同群体的历史组织能力。当制度所支持的利益分配与社会中的权力分配一致，并且这些制度的经济和政治结果随着时间的推移是可持续的，政治解决方案就会出现。在发达国家，权力的分配主要基于正式制度和权利产生的收入的分配。权力与正式制度之间的对应关系解释了为什么发达国家的韦伯式国家能够有效地执行正式制度。相反，发展中国家的权力分配很大程度上依赖于非资本主义部门的组织能力。在许多情况下，这些能力的历史根源可以追溯到殖民历史或更早。在这里，仅靠正式制度无法支持与这些权力分配相一致的利益分配。像庇护分配规则这样的非正式制度，以及对特定正式制度运作方式的非正式适应，在使制度结构支持的利益分配与权力分配保持一致方面发挥着关键作用。因此，政治解决的差异可以解释为什么发展中国家的制度结构不同，类似的正式制度也有不同的表现。政治解决方案还定义了特定制度变革面临的“增长-稳定权衡”：如果制度变革的实施将政治稳定推至该社会的容忍极限以下，那么制度变革就无法实施。因此，对政治解决方案的理解可以为研究各国的制度绩效和演变提供一个框架。虽然所有发展中国家都有各种各样的“庇护主义”政治解决方案，但这些庇护主义解决方案之间存在显著差异。从两个方面考察了国家之间的差异：执政联盟的组织及其与新兴生产部门的关系。分析框架适用于本系列论文中研究的案例研究国家，以概述其政治解决方案在这些特征方面如何随着时间的推移而演变。它们的政治解决方案的演变显示与其促进增长的正式机构的变化和这些机构的绩效密切相关。因此，这种分析有助于确定能够充分实施的治理变革，从而在特定国家产生发展差异，并提供一个框架，以了解不同国家的政治解决正在发生变化的道路。
It is well known that institutions work very differently across countries because their political contexts are different. It is also understood that this has important implications for the design of governance priorities in different countries. This paper develops an analysis of the ‘political settlement’ to provide an analytical framework for analysing institutions and governance in developing countries. Central to this analysis is an understanding of the distribution of power. We define this as the relative holding power of different groups and organizations contesting the distribution of resources. Holding power is partly based on income and wealth but also on historically rooted capacities of different groups to organize. A political settlement emerges when the distribution of benefits supported by its institutions is consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the economic and political outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time. In advanced countries, the distribution of power is largely based on the distribution of incomes generated by formal institutions and rights. The correspondence between power and formal institutions explains why Weberian states in advanced countries can effectively enforce formal institutions. In contrast, the distribution of power in developing countries draws significantly on organizational abilities based in non-capitalist sectors. In many cases, the historical roots of these capabilities go back to colonial history or earlier. Here, formal institutions alone cannot support distributions of benefits consistent with these distributions of power. Informal institutions like patronclient allocative rules, and informal adaptations to the ways in which particular formal institutions work play a critical role in bringing the distribution of benefits supported by the institutional structure into line with the distribution of power. Differences in the political settlement can therefore explain why developing country institutional structures are different and similar formal institutions also perform differently. The political settlement also defines the ‘growth-stability trade-off’ facing particular institutional changes: institutional changes cannot be implemented if their implementation pushes political stability below the tolerance limit of that society. An understanding of the political settlement can therefore provide a framework for looking at institutional performance and evolution across countries. While all developing countries have variants of ‘clientelist’ political settlements, there are significant differences between these clientelist settlements. Differences between countries are examined along two dimensions: the organization of the ruling coalition and its relationship to the emerging productive sector. The analytical framework is applied to the case study countries studied in this series of papers to outline how their political settlements evolved over time in terms of these characteristics. The evolution of their political settlements is shown to be closely related to changes in their formal growth-enhancing institutions and the performance of these institutions. This analysis can therefore help to identify governance changes that can be sufficiently enforced to make a developmental difference in particular countries as well as providing a framework for understanding the paths along which the political settlement is changing in different countries.