On the Security of a Repaired Mental Poker Protocol
On the Security of a Repaired Mental Poker Protocol
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论修复心理扑克协议的安全性
DOI：
10.1109/itng.2006.103
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Sebé
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jordi Castellà;J. Domingo;F. Sebé
在2003年，Zhao，Varadharajan和Mu提出了一个心理扑克协议，其安全性在2004年被证明是有缺陷的：任何玩家（或任何知道牌组编码的局外人）都能够在不知道加密密钥的情况下解密加密的牌。2005年，前两位作者发表了这个无TTP的心理扑克协议的修复版本。我们在这里展示了第二个版本也有缺陷：第一个玩家可以找到最终加密的洗牌牌的所有明文。这两个协议都类似于Shamir-Rivest-Adleman的心理扑克，但它们用ElGamal类交换密码取代了指数交换密码。我们得出结论，改变底层的交换密码是他们的弱点的原因
In 2003, Zhao, Varadharajan and Mu proposed a mental poker protocol whose security was shown to be flawed in 2004: any player (or any outsider knowing the deck coding) is able to decrypt encrypted cards without knowing the encryption key. In 2005, the first two authors published a repaired version of this TTP-free mental poker protocol. We show here that this second version is also flawed: the first player can find all cleartexts of the final encrypted shuffled deck of cards. Both protocols are similar to Shamir-Rivest-Adleman's mental poker, but they replace an exponential commutative cipher with an ElGamal-like commutative cipher. We conclude that changing the underlying commutative cipher is the reason of their weakness