Mobile tax base as a global common
Mobile tax base as a global common
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移动税基作为全球共同点
DOI：
10.1007/s10797-008-9075-y
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Kai A. Konrad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kai A. Konrad
如果各国预期在税率方面会出现国际贝特朗竞争，它们可能会努力降低本国纳税人的流动性，或者增加其他地方纳税人的流动性。提供了关于各国使用哪些活动的零碎证据。如果忠诚和非忠诚公民或投资者群体的规模是内生的，则分析这些活动与Bertrand税收竞争相互作用。此外，考虑了税收协调和最低税对这些类型的非价格竞争的影响。家庭依恋降低了税收竞争的强度，但对在这种家庭依恋中投入大量资金的国家产生了战略劣势。税收和高最低税的协调可以加强各国对家庭依恋的投资。
If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their taxpayers less mobile or increases the mobility of taxpayers elsewhere. Piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use is provided. Such activities are analyzed that interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the groups of loyal and nonloyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further, the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of nonprice competition are considered. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries’ investment in home attachment.