The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
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DOI：
10.1007/s00182-016-0554-6
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发表时间：
2017-08
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Takaaki Abe;Yukihiko Funaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takaaki Abe;Yukihiko Funaki
本文的目的是为配分函数形式对策的核不空提供一个充分必要条件。将Bondareva-Shapley条件推广到配分函数形式的博弈中，给出了“悲观核”和“乐观核”不空的条件。悲观（乐观）核心描述了假设偏离联盟中的参与者预期其他参与者的最坏（最好）反应时的稳定性。此外，我们基于外生分区定义了另外两个核心概念。并给出了配分函数形式博弈中的平衡集合及其一些经济应用。
The purpose of this paper is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core for partition function form games. We generalize the Bondareva–Shapley condition to partition function form games and present the condition for the non-emptiness of “the pessimistic core”, and “the optimistic core”. The pessimistic (optimistic) core describes the stability in assuming that players in a deviating coalition anticipate the worst (best) reaction from the other players. In addition, we define two other notions of the core based on exogenous partitions. The balanced collections in partition function form games and some economic applications are also provided.