Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an Asset Became a Liability
Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an Asset Became a Liability
复制标题
欧洲怀疑主义和保守派选举支持：资产如何变成负债
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Geoffrey Evans
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Geoffrey Evans
本文利用英国选举小组研究来评估 1992 年至 1996 年间选民和政党对欧洲一体化的立场对保守党选举支持的影响。在此期间，公众对欧洲一体化的支持水平显着下降，因此到 1996 年，与主要竞争对手相比，保守党比 1992 年选举时更接近总体公众舆论。然而，对个人对一体化的立场与他们随后归因于政党的立场之间的相似性进行的分析表明，保守党在欧洲问题上的分歧帮助将这一潜在的选举资产变成了负债，使该党比其他两个主要政治竞争者中的任何一个都更远离个人选民自己的立场。此外，即使在过去的投票和其他问题上的邻近性受到控制的情况下，一体化问题上的邻近性也预示着投票结果，欧洲问题很可能会导致选举成本，而不是它本可以产生的好处。这些发现的一个含义是，如果保守党希望在这个问题上取得好成绩，他们将需要采取一致的欧洲怀疑论路线，但这样的策略不太可能轻易维持。
This article uses the British Election Panel Study to assess the impact of voters' and party positions vis-à-vis European integration on Conservative electoral support between 1992 and 1996. Over this period levels of public support for European integration declined markedly, so that by 1996 the Conservative party was even closer to aggregate public opinion, when compared with its main competitors, than it had been at the time of the 1992 election. However, an analysis of the proximity between individuals' positions on integration and the positions they then attributed to the parties indicates that Conservative divisions over Europe helped turn this potential electoral asset into a liability, leaving the party further from individual voters' own positions than were either of the other two main political contenders. Moreover, as issue proximity on integration predicts voting even when past vote and proximity on other issues are controlled for, it is likely that the European question will have resulted in electoral costs rather than the benefits it could have produced. One implication of these findings is that if the Conservatives hope to do well on this issue they will need to adopt a consistent Eurosceptic line, but such a strategy is unlikely to be easily maintained.