The political economy of environmental and social security policies: the role of environmental lobbying
The political economy of environmental and social security policies: the role of environmental lobbying
复制标题
环境和社会保障政策的政治经济学：环境游说的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1085845
复制
发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tetsuo Ono
社会保障为老年人提供退休福利，牺牲了年轻人的工作，而环境投资则以老年人的利益为代价，使年轻人的未来受益。本文提出了一个模型，将这种代际冲突的公共支出，并认为环境投资和社会保障的政治决定，通过关注马尔可夫政治均衡。结果表明：（1）政治均衡一般是无效率的;（2）从长期来看，环境游说可以改善环境质量，但会降低寿命效用。
Social security provides retirement benefits to the old at the expense of the working young, while environmental investment benefits the future of the young at the expense of the old. This paper presents a model incorporating this intergenerational conflict on public spending and considers the political determination of environmental investment and social security by focusing on the Markovian political equilibria. It is shown that (1) the political equilibria are generally inefficient, and (2) the introduction of environmental lobbying into politics may improve environmental quality but degrade lifetime utility in the long run.
人口老龄化背景下环境税的政治经济学
DOI：
--
发表时间：
--
期刊：
Environmental and Resource Economics (掲載予定)
影响因子：
--
作者：
Tetsuo Ono;Tetsuo Ono
通讯作者：
Tetsuo Ono