Continuous Time Repeated Games
Continuous Time Repeated Games
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DOI：
10.2307/2526948
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发表时间：
1993-02
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
J. Bergin;W. Macleod
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Bergin;W. Macleod
本文建立了一个连续时间完全信息博弈的策略行为模型，其中包括离散时间的常规重复博弈作为特例。这里开发的模型承认一个非常大的类的策略，允许一个重复的游戏模型扩展到连续的时间。这个博弈中的均衡集可能很大--在许多情况下，等于可行的个体理性收益集。作者还研究了在此框架下的重新谈判证明的限制，并将这些结果应用到古诺双寡头垄断的例子。1993年由宾夕法尼亚大学经济系和大坂大学社会经济研究协会版权所有。
In this paper, the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may be large--in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s. The authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a Cournot duopoly example. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.