RandomPad: Usability of Randomized Mobile Keypads for Defeating Inference Attacks
RandomPad: Usability of Randomized Mobile Keypads for Defeating Inference Attacks
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
Anindya Maiti;Kirsten Crager
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文献类型：
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作者：
Anindya Maiti;Kirsten Crager
—The feasibility of malicious keystroke inference attacks on mobile device keypads has been demonstrated by multiple recent research efforts, but very little has been accomplished in the direction of protection against such attacks. One common assumption in these attacks is that the adversary has knowledge of the size and layout of the keypad employed by the target user, which is reasonable as keypad layouts and sizes are generally standard. Thus, an effective protection strategy against such keystroke inference attacks would be to randomly change the layout of the target keypad. However, before proposing unconventional changes to the widely used and highly familiar default keypads, a comprehensive usability evaluation is required. This paper accomplishes this goal by comprehensively studying the usability of randomized keypads that employ varying degrees of randomization in terms of key size, sequence and position. The privacy-usability trade-off of different randomized keypad strategies is then analyzed by empirically comparing their ease-of-usage and security assurance.
