Real-Time Rejection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System
Real-Time Rejection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System
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DOI：
10.1109/tie.2017.2787581
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发表时间：
2018-08-01
影响因子：
7.7
通讯作者：
Taha, Ahmad F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Khalajmehrabadi, Ali;Gatsis, Nikolaos;Taha, Ahmad F.
介绍了一种针对全球定位系统（GPS）时间同步攻击的时间同步攻击抑制与缓解（TSARM）技术。与以前的方法相反，该技术估计GPS接收机的时钟偏差和漂移沿着可能的攻击。在估计了攻击的时刻之后，校正了接收器的时钟偏差和漂移。所提出的技术是计算效率高，可以很容易地实现在真实的时间的方式互补的标准算法的位置，速度和时间估计在现成的接收机。该技术的性能进行了评估，从一个真实的GPS接收机的一组收集的数据。我们的方法呈现出良好的时间恢复符合应用程序的要求。数值结果表明，TSARM技术优于文献中的竞争方法。
This paper introduces the time synchronization attack rejection and mitigation (TSARM) technique for time synchronization attacks over the global positioning system (GPS). The technique estimates the clock bias and drift of the GPS receiver along with the possible attack contrary to previous approaches. Having estimated the time instants of the attack, the clock bias and drift of the receiver are corrected. The proposed technique is computationally efficient and can be easily implemented in real time in a fashion complementary to standard algorithms for position, velocity, and time estimation in off-the-shelf receivers. The performance of this technique is evaluated on a set of collected data from a real GPS receiver. Our method renders excellent time recovery consistent with the application requirements. The numerical results demonstrate that the TSARM technique outperforms competing approaches in the literature.