Counterfactual thinking and regulatory focus: implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity.
Counterfactual thinking and regulatory focus: implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity.
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DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1109
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发表时间：
1999-12
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
N. Roese;T. Hur;Ginger L. Pennington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Roese;T. Hur;Ginger L. Pennington
反事实思维与调节焦点相关，可以解释先前的经验不一致，例如加法反事实（不作为的突变）是否比减法反事实（行为的突变）发生得更频繁或更少。在实验1中，调节焦点缓和这种模式，在添加剂的反事实被激活的促进失败，而减少的反事实被激活的预防失败。在实验2中，添加剂反事实引起的促进重点，并表示因果充分性，而减法反事实引起的预防重点，并表示因果的必要性。在实验3中，沮丧激活加性反事实，而激动激活减性反事实。这些发现阐明了反事实思维、动机和目标之间的相互联系。
Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that explains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterfactuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtractive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory focus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated by prevention failure. In Experiment 2, additive counterfactuals evoked a promotion focus and expressed causal sufficiency, whereas subtractive counterfactuals evoked a prevention focus and expressed causal necessity. In Experiment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation activated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the interconnections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.