Explaining the Choice among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
Explaining the Choice among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
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解释美国电信行业监管计划的选择
DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00237.x
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
D. Sappington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stephen G. Donald;D. Sappington
我们调查了为什么美国不同的州在他们的电信行业选择不同的监管计划。本文提出了一个简单的理论模型，并对该问题进行了实证分析。我们发现，在以下情况下，一个州更有可能用激励性监管取代回报率监管：(1)居民基本地方服务率在历史上相对较高；（二）在国家规定的回报率下允许的收益特别高或者特别低；(3)国家领导人往往来自两个主要政党，而不是来自一个政党；（四）城市人口增长较快；(5)州内竞争对手的旁路活动不太明显。麻省理工学院出版社1995年版权所有。
We investigate why different states in the United States choose different regulatory plans in their telecommunications industry. We present a simple theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the issue. We find that a state is more likely to replace rate-of-return regulation with incentive regulation when: (1) residential basic local service rates have historically been relatively high; (2) allowed earnings under rate-of-return regulation in the state have been either particularly high or particularly low; (3) the state's leaders tend to come from both major political parties, rather than from a single party; (4) the state's urban population is growing relatively rapidly; and (5) the bypass activity of competitors in the state is less pronounced. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.