Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule
Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule
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货币政策、银行业危机和弗里德曼规则
DOI：
10.1257/000282802320189122
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Smith
银行危机是经常发生的事件。Gerard Caprio和Daniela Klingebiel（1997）列举了过去25年中发生的80多起银行业危机。有趣的是，一些银行危机与任何产出损失无关，而另一些则涉及大规模衰退。最后，众所周知，银行危机的概率随着通货膨胀率的上升而上升（见Asli Demirguc-Kunt和Enrica Detragiache，1997; John Boyd等人，2001 a，B）。虽然关于危机发生时货币政策的实施存在公认的智慧，但对于“正常时期”货币政策的实施如何影响银行危机发生的可能性，没有正式的处理方法。为了填补这一空白，我考虑的经济体中，空间分离和有限的沟通创造了货币的交易角色，和随机冲击代理人的流动性偏好创造了银行的作用。此外，银行还面临提款需求的随机性。当提款需求足够高时，银行就会耗尽现金储备。我们有充分的理由将此与银行业恐慌联系起来。在银行业恐慌期间损失的产出取决于提款需求有多大。有些银行危机没有造成产出损失，而另一些危机则造成资源供应大幅减少。此外，在“正常时期”，货币政策的实施也会影响银行危机的可能性。名义利率（通货膨胀率）越高，恐慌的可能性就越大。将名义利率降至零（遵循弗里德曼规则）可以消除银行恐慌。这为弗里德曼规则提供了新的理论基础。尽管如此，执行弗里德曼规则的传统方法从未产生最佳资源分配。特别是，低名义利率促使银行持有大量现金储备，从而放弃更具社会生产力的投资。实际上，弗里德曼规则促使银行自愿成为狭义银行。银行系统非常安全，但它的投资水平并不理想。执行弗里德曼规则的非传统方法，例如允许以零名义利率无限制地进入贴现窗口，要么导致均衡不存在，要么导致巨大的不确定性。没有一个均衡是完全最优的。
Banking crises are frequent events. Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel (1997) catalog over 80 banking crises during the last 25 years. Interestingly, some banking crises are associated with no output losses whatsoever, while others involve massive recessions. Finally, it is known that the probability of a banking crisis rises as the rate of inflation rises (see Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, 1997; John Boyd et al., 2001a, b). While received wisdom exists about the conduct of monetary policy while a crisis is underway, there is no formal treatment of how the conduct of monetary policy during “normal times” affects the potential for banking crises to occur. To fill that gap, I consider economies where spatial separation and limited communication create a transactions role for money, and random shocks to agents’ liquidity preferences create a role for banks. In addition, banks confront randomness in withdrawal demand. When withdrawal demand is sufficiently high, banks exhaust their cash reserves. There are good reasons to associate this with a banking panic. The output lost during a banking panic depends on how great withdrawal demand is. Some banking crises generate no output losses, while others generate large reductions in resource availability. In addition, the conduct of monetary policy during “normal times” affects the probability of a banking crisis. The higher the nominal interest rate (the inflation rate), the higher is the probability of a panic. Driving the nominal interest rate to zero (following the Friedman rule) eliminates bank panics. This constitutes a new rationale for the Friedman rule. Nonetheless, conventional methods of implementing the Friedman rule never produce an optimal resource allocation. In particular, low nominal interest rates induce banks to hold large cash reserves, thereby forgoing socially more productive investments. In effect, the Friedman rule induces banks to become narrow banks voluntarily. The banking system is very safe, but it undertakes a suboptimal level of investment. Less conventional methods for implementing the Friedman rule, such as allowing unrestricted access to the discount window at a zero nominal interest rate, lead either to the nonexistence of equilibrium, or to massive indeterminacies. None of the equilibria will be consistent with full optimality.