Getting institutions "right" for whom credit constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of investment
Getting institutions "right" for whom credit constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of investment
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DOI：
10.1111/1467-8276.00111
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发表时间：
2003-02-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Olinto, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Carter, MR;Olinto, P
产权改革通常被假设为通过投资需求和信贷供给效应来促进投资。然而，当信贷供给效应减弱时，产权改革预计将促使流动性受限的农场减少对动产资本的投资，即使它们增加了对附属资本的投资。对巴拉圭的小组数据进行的计量经济学分析证实了这一预期。虽然所有农民都经历了积极的投资需求效应，但流动性受限的生产者相应地减少了对流动资本的需求。考虑到财富偏向流动性约束的估计模式，产权改革将使制度只对较富裕的生产者“正确”。
Property rights reform is typically hypothesized to boost investment through investment demand and credit supply effects. Yet when the credit supply effect is muted, property rights reform would be expected to induce liquidity-constrained farms to reduce investment in movable capital even as they increase investment in attached capital. This expectation is corroborated by econometric analysis of panel data from Paraguay. While all farmers experience a positive investment demand effect, liquidity-constrained producers correspondingly reduce their demand for movable capital. Given an estimated pattern of wealth-biased liquidity constraints, property rights reform will get institutions "right" for only wealthier producers.