A New Argument For Intrinsic Biological Essentialism

A New Argument For Intrinsic Biological Essentialism
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内在生物本质主义的新论点

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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
Travis Dumsday
Travis Dumsday
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作者：
Travis Dumsday

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内在生物本质主义（Intrinsic biological essentialism，INBE）认为生物分类群具有固定的身份条件，这些条件至少部分由内在属性组成。在生物学哲学和理论生物学长期以来几乎被普遍拒绝之后，INBE正在卷土重来。在这里，我试图通过澄清INBE的性质，为它发展一个新的论点，并解决一个重要的反本质主义的批评来支持这种复兴。
Intrinsic biological essentialism (INBE) is the view that biological taxa have fixed identity conditions, conditions which consist at least in part of intrinsic properties. After a long period of near universal rejection within both philosophy of biology and theoretical biology, INBE is making a comeback. Here I attempt to support this revival by clarifying the nature of INBE, developing a new argument on its behalf, and addressing an important anti-essentialist critique.