Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution
Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution
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谈判和内战解决的相互依存阶段
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
Michael G. Findley
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作者：
Michael G. Findley
本文将内战解决视为一个由多个相互依赖的阶段组成的过程。它直接涉及这样的观念：和平只能通过战斗、谈判、达成协议和执行协议的过程才能实现。我假设和平进程早期阶段的事件会对后期阶段产生影响，但影响方式并不总是相同。借鉴战争的讨价还价模型，我考虑了可能阻止成功讨价还价的两个因素——僵局和参与者的数量——如何鼓励和平进程早期的合作，但却阻碍后期阶段的持久合作。使用嵌套二分法统计方法来捕捉相互依存性，我发现了以下论点的支持：僵局和参与者的数量根据和平进程的阶段会产生不同的影响。结果证实了理论和政策工作需要将和平视为一个相互依存、连续的过程。
This article examines civil war resolution as a process comprised of multiple interdependent stages. It engages directly the idea that peace emerges only as a process comprised of battle, negotiation, agreement, and implementation of an agreement. I hypothesize that events at earlier stages of the peace process have implications for later stages, but not always in the same ways. Drawing on bargaining models of war, I consider how two factors that might prevent successful bargaining—stalemates and the number of actors—can encourage cooperation early in a peace process but impede lasting cooperation at later stages. Using a nested dichotomies statistical approach to capture interdependence, I find support for the argument that stalemates and the number of actors have different effects depending on the stage of the peace process. The results substantiate the need in theoretical and policy work to consider peace as an interdependent, sequential process.