Policy with Dispersed Information
Policy with Dispersed Information
复制标题
信息分散的策略
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Pavan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Angeletos;A. Pavan
本文研究一类经济体的政策，在这些经济体中，关于共同相关的基本面（如总生产率和需求状况）的信息是分散的，不能由政府集中。在这些经济体中，信息的分散使用可能会因为私人和社会回报之间的差异或信息外部性而无法有效。在第一种情况下，低效率表现为过度的非基本面波动（对共同噪音的过度反应）或过度的横截面分散（对特殊噪音的过度反应）。在第二种情况下，低效率表现为次优的社会学习（宏观经济数据、金融价格和其他经济活动指标中所含信息的质量低下）。在这两种情况下，一个新的角色，政策被确定：政府可以通过操纵激励代理人面对决定如何使用他们的可用信息来源时，改善福利。我们的主要结果是，这可以通过适当地设计对总活动的边际税的权变来实现。这种偶然性使政府能够控制均衡对不同类型噪音的反应，提高价格和宏观数据的信息质量，并在总体上恢复分散使用信息的效率。
This paper studies policy in a class of economies in which information about commonly-relevant fundamentals -- such as aggregate productivity and demand conditions -- is dispersed and can not be centralized by the government. In these economies, the decentralized use of information can fail to be efficient either because of discrepancies between private and social payoffs, or because of informational externalities. In the first case, inefficiency manifests itself in excessive non-fundamental volatility (overreaction to common noise) or excessive cross-sectional dispersion (overreaction to idiosyncratic noise). In the second case, inefficiency manifests itself in suboptimal social learning (low quality of information contained in macroeconomic data, financial prices, and other indicators of economic activity). In either case, a novel role for policy is identified: the government can improve welfare by manipulating the incentives agents face when deciding how to use their available sources of information. Our key result is that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of marginal taxes on aggregate activity. This contingency permits the government to control the reaction of equilibrium to different types of noise, to improve the quality of information in prices and macro data, and, in overall, to restore efficiency in the decentralized use of information.