Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions
Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions
复制标题
最低收入核心选择拍卖中出价过高的激励措施
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Marion Ott
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Beck;Marion Ott
我们发现新的最小收益核心选择（MRCS）拍卖的均衡，与以前确定的均衡，涉及出价过高（出价超过自己的真实价值的一些包的商品。在充分信息条件下，每一个MRCS拍卖在每一种可能的设置下都存在出价过高的均衡，并且这些均衡具有与先前已知的出价着色均衡不同的性质。也就是说，他们可以导致严格更高的收入为卖方和更大的价格差异之间的投标人。先前的研究MRCS游戏的不完全信息假设限制策略空间，防止过度出价。在本文中，我们允许投标人访问他们的完整的策略集，并表明，在某些情况下，超额出价发生在所有的贝叶斯均衡在非支配策略。在一个简单的设置与独立的私人价值，均衡策略的一组特定的MRCS拍卖采用的出价阴影和出价过高的混合物。这些新的均衡提高了相对于有限策略空间均衡的预期效率，并导致比Vickrey包拍卖更高的预期收入。第二个不完全信息的设置表明，均衡与出价过高，可以在某种意义上是唯一的。在这种情况下，每一个贝叶斯均衡的非支配策略的每个MRCS拍卖至少有一个出价过高的投标人，并没有出价阴影的获胜包。出价过高消除了门槛问题，导致了一个ecient分配和支付，在核心方面，
We nd new equilibria of minimum-revenue core-selecting (MRCS) auctions that, in contrast to previously identied equilibria, involve overbidding { bidding more than one’s true value for some packages of goods. With full information, every MRCS auction in every possible setting has equilibria with overbidding and these equilibria have dierent properties than the previously known equilibria with bid shading. Namely, they can lead to strictly higher revenues for the seller and larger price dierences among bidders. Previous studies of MRCS games with incomplete information assumed restricted strategy spaces that prevented overbidding. In this paper, we allow bidders access to their complete strategy sets and show that, in some settings, overbidding occurs in all Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies. In a simple setting with independent private values, equilibrium strategies of a particular set of MRCS auctions employ a mixture of bid shading and overbidding. These new equilibria improve expected eciency relative to equilibria with restricted strategy spaces and lead to higher expected revenues than those from the Vickrey package auction. A second incomplete-information setting demonstrates that equilibria with overbidding can be in some sense unique. In this setting, every Bayesian equilibrium in undominated strategies of every MRCS auction has at least one bidder who overbids and there is no bid shading on winning packages. Overbidding eliminates the threshold problem, leading to an ecient assignment and payos that are in the core with respect to