Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature
Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature
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等级制立法机关中的不公正划分
DOI：
10.1007/s11238-019-09704-9
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Kobayashi Katsuya and Tasnadi Attila
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
安藤至大;片岡八重子;黒木正郎;富田裕;安藤至大;安藤至大;Katsuya Kobayashi and Hideo Konishi;Kobayashi Katsuya and Tasnadi Attila
我们建立了一个代议制民主的多重层级模型，在这个模型中，公民选举选区代表，选区代表选举县代表，县代表选举州代表，州代表选举总理。我们使用我们的模型来表明，随着层级数量的增加，最终代表决定的政策可能会变得更加极端，因为不公正划分选区的机会增加了。因此，足够多的选民为选区制定者提供了优势，使她能够实施自己喜欢的政策。
We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which citizens elect ward representatives, ward representatives elect county representatives, county representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases as a result of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters provide a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy.