Escalation of commitment with transparent future outcomes.
Escalation of commitment with transparent future outcomes.
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承诺升级，未来结果透明。
DOI：
10.1027/1618-3169.52.1.67
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
N. Bonini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Karlsson;T. Gärling;N. Bonini
非理性决策的一个常见案例是，在先前的金钱、精力或时间投资（沉没成本）不成功后，倾向于将承诺升级为选择的行动过程。在先前的研究中，人们认为，当未来的结果和替代投资是透明的时，升级不会发生。与这一论点不一致的是，在一项实验中，本科生被提出了带有沉没成本的虚构投资问题，当提供有关投资选择和对未来回报的估计的全部信息时，升级被证明。因此，这表明人们可能会升级，尽管知道这不会使他们在经济上变得更好。要更全面地理解升级，就需要理清人们升级的非经济原因。
A frequent case of irrational decision making is the tendency to escalate commitment to a chosen course of action after unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (sunk costs). In previous research it is argued that escalation does not occur when future outcomes and alternative investments are transparent. Inconsistent with this argument, in an experiment in which undergraduates were presented fictitious investment problems with sunk costs, escalation was demonstrated when full information was given about investment alternatives and estimates of future returns. Thus, it is indicated that people may escalate despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive understanding of escalation requires disentangling people's noneconomic reasons for escalation.