A Game-Theoretic Approach for Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks with Incomplete Information
A Game-Theoretic Approach for Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks with Incomplete Information
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DOI：
10.1587/transcom.e95.b.1117
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发表时间：
2012-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
X. Tan;Liang Li;Wei Guo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
X. Tan;Liang Li;Wei Guo
认知传输中的一个重要问题是多个次用户从单个主用户处动态获取空闲频谱。现有的频谱共享方案采用确定性古诺博弈来描述这个问题，其解是纳什均衡。这一提法是基于两个隐含的假设。首先，每个次级用户愿意与所有其他用户完全交换传输参数，因此知道他们的完整信息。第二，在纳什均衡时，主用户用于频谱共享的未使用频谱总是大于所有次用户的总频率需求。然而，这两种假设一般都不成立。为了弥补这一点，本文考虑了一个更现实的不完全信息假设，即，每个次用户可以选择隐藏他们的私有信息以获得更高的传输效益。在此假设下，在主用户未使用带宽足够大的情况下，我们采用概率古诺博弈的方法来设计一个机会频谱共享方案，以最大化所有次用户的总收益.贝叶斯均衡被认为是这个博弈的解。此外，我们证明了一个次要用户可以提高他们的预期利益，通过主动隐藏其传输参数，并增加他们的方差。另一方面，当主用户的未使用频谱小于贝叶斯均衡下所有次用户的最大总频率需求时，我们为主用户制定了一个约束优化问题，以最大限度地提高其频谱共享的利润，并修改所提出的频谱共享方案来解决这个问题。这提供了克服现有频谱共享方案的上述两个限制的统一方法。
One important issue in cognitive transmission is for multiple secondary users to dynamically acquire spare spectrum from the single primary user. The existing spectrum sharing scheme adopts a deterministic Cournot game to formulate this problem, of which the solution is the Nash equilibrium. This formulation is based on two implicit assumptions. First, each secondary user is willing to fully exchange transmission parameters with all others and hence knows their complete information. Second, the unused spectrum of the primary user for spectrum sharing is always larger than the total frequency demand of all secondary users at the Nash equilibrium. However, both assumptions may not be true in general. To remedy this, the present paper considers a more realistic assumption of incomplete information, i.e., each secondary user may choose to conceal their private information for achieving higher transmission benefit. Following this assumption and given that the unused bandwidth of the primary user is large enough, we adopt a probabilistic Cournot game to formulate an opportunistic spectrum sharing scheme for maximizing the total benefit of all secondary users. Bayesian equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. Moreover, we prove that a secondary user can improve their expected benefit by actively hiding its transmission parameters and increasing their variance. On the other hand, when the unused spectrum of the primary user is smaller than the maximal total frequency demand of all secondary users at the Bayesian equilibrium, we formulate a constrained optimization problem for the primary user to maximize its profit in spectrum sharing and revise the proposed spectrum sharing scheme to solve this problem heuristically. This provides a unified approach to overcome the aforementioned two limitations of the existing spectrum sharing scheme.