Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility
Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility
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税收合规性和排名相关的预期效用
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Grégoire Rota Graziosi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Arcand;Grégoire Rota Graziosi
通过对经典的阿林厄姆和桑德莫[1972]在等级依赖期望效用（RDEU）下的税收遵从问题的阐述，可以简单地解释在实证研究中观察到的完全遵从的“超额”水平，这是标准期望效用（EU）理论无法解释的。RDEU为这个难题提供了一个令人信服的答案，而不需要最近在文献中提出的道德情绪或耻辱论点。正式地，我们表明，在RDEU公理下，完全遵守对决策者来说是最优的阈值审计概率或惩罚率明显低于欧盟的情况，并且在RDEU下，低报的最佳水平更低。使用概率加权函数的各种参数化的数值模拟说明了两种模型之间的巨大数量差异，而对美国过去50年的低报率的模拟显示了RDEU如何在某种程度上解释税收合规难题。
Formulating the classic Allingham and Sandmo [1972] tax compliance problem under Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) provides a simple explanation for the “excess” level of full compliance observed in empirical studies, which standard Expected Utility (EU) theory is unable to explain. RDEU provides a compelling answer to this puzzle, without the need for the moral sentiments or stigma arguments that have recently been advanced in the literature. Formally, we show that the threshold audit probability or penalty rate at which full compliance becomes optimal for the decisionmaker are significantly lower under RDEU axiomatics than in the EU case, and that the optimal level of underreporting is lower under RDEU. Numerical simulations using various parameterizations of the probability weighting function illustrate the large quantitative differences between the two models, while a simulation of underreporting rates in the US over the past 50 years shows how RDEU can go some way towards explaining the tax-compliance puzzle.