Monetary Policy Games and Coalitions in a Two-country Model with Unionised Wage Setting
Monetary Policy Games and Coalitions in a Two-country Model with Unionised Wage Setting
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工会工资设定两国模型中的货币政策博弈和联盟
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028597
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Athina Zervoyianni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Athina Zervoyianni
我们表明，在相互依赖的工会经济体中，国内外赌博者之间的合作相对于普遍的纳什博弈，既改善了他们自己的地位，也改善了社会福利。此外，从全面的纳什游戏转向国内外工会之间以及国内外政策制定者之间的合作，可能会带来帕累托改进，或者对联合政府来说，结果比纳什游戏更可取。然而，国内联盟可能缺乏工会的支持。这样的联合明确地改善了政策制定者的立场。然而，在一个相互依存的世界里，与其他政权相比，它们并不一定会让工会变得更好。
We show that in interdependent, unionised economies co-operation between wagesetters at home and abroad improves both their own positions and social welfare relative to universal Nash play. Moreover, a move from all-round Nash play to co-operation between home and foreign unions and between home and foreign policymakers may produce Pareto improvements, or outcomes that are preferable to Nash play for the coalition as a whole. However, intra-national coalitions may lack the support of unions. Such coalitions unambiguously improve the policymakers' position. However, in an interdependent world, they do not necessarily make the unions better off relative to other regimes.