Knowledge and the Internal
Knowledge and the Internal
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知识与内在
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Mcdowell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Mcdowell
1. 我将从塞拉斯的观点出发，即知识——至少是理性动物所享有的知识——是理性空间中的一种立足点我所关心的是一个熟悉的哲学辩证法，我将根据塞拉斯思想的情况来探讨，当理性空间中的立场形象经历某种变形时，会发生什么。这是一种变形，我们可以从熟悉的辩证法是多么不令人满意中学到一些东西。
1. I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge-at least as enjoyed by rational animals-is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons.2 My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of standings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. That it is a deformation is something we can learn from how unsatisfactory the familiar dialectic is.