Disorganization
Disorganization
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.8755
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Kremer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
O. Blanchard;M. Kremer
在中央计划经济体制下，许多企业的关键投入依赖于单一供应商。过渡导致供应商和买方之间的分散式讨价还价。在不完全合同或信息不对称的情况下，讨价还价可能会无效地破裂，如果生产链将许多专业化生产者联系起来，产量将急剧下降。在西方，缓解这些问题的机制，如声誉，只能在转型中发挥有限的作用。经验证据表明，生产过程最复杂的产品的产量下降最多，而且前苏联的解体比中欧更为重要。
Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for critical inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inefficiently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers, output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical evidence suggests that outputs has fallen farthest for the goods with the most complex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the former Soviet Union than in the Central Europe.