Average inflation targeting: Time inconsistency and ambiguous communication
Average inflation targeting: Time inconsistency and ambiguous communication
复制标题
平均通胀目标：时间不一致和沟通不明确
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.05.010
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Wu, Jing Cynthia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jia, Chengcheng;Wu, Jing Cynthia
我们研究了平均通胀目标制（AIT）的含义。当私营部门相信央行的声明时，AIT改善了通胀-产出权衡。事后，央行有动机实施通胀目标制，以实现社会福利最大化。接下来，我们研究了中央银行是否以及如何说服私营部门，并发现模糊的沟通有助于中央银行获得信誉和改善福利。这些结果适用于AIT公告的几个关键方面，并不依赖于特定的建模假设。
We study the implications of average inflation targeting (AIT). AIT improves the inflation-output trade-off when the private sector believes the central bank’s announcement. Ex post, the central bank has the incentive to implement inflation targeting instead to maximize social welfare. Next, we examine whether and how the central bank can convince the private sector, and find ambiguous communication helps the central bank gain credibility and improve welfare. These results apply to several key aspects of AIT announcement and do not rely on specific modeling assumptions.