Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation
Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation
复制标题
存在垂直分离的情况下的最佳专利政策
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.03.027
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Michi Nishihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haejun Jeon;Michi Nishihara
我们研究了在垂直分离的市场中，发明者和制造商就版税进行讨价还价的许可证合同。这种拖延问题是双边的，因为不仅许可方，而且被许可方也可以推迟新技术的引进。考虑到专利和侵权惩罚作为专利工具的概率有效性，我们得出了最优政策作为它们的混合;它们不仅总是可以最大化财富总量，而且还可以根据每个企业对新技术引进的贡献来分配财富。从专利改革的角度来看，我们的模型支持整个市场价值规则，因为它总是能产生最佳结果。我们还表明，在市场中有自我修正的余地，即使没有政府的干预，企业可以调整自己的讨价还价能力，以改善社会福利在一定程度上。
We examine a license contract in vertically separated markets, in which an inventor and a manufacturer bargain over royalties. The hold-up problem is found to be bilateral in that not only the licensor but also the licensee can delay the introduction of new technology. Given the probabilistic validity of patents and penalty upon infringement as patent instruments, we derive the optimal policies as a mix of them; not only can they always maximize the total amount of wealth but also they allocate the wealth according to each firm’s contribution to the introduction of new technology. From the perspective of patent reform, our model supports the entire market value rule on the ground that it can always yield the first-best result. We also show that there is scope for self-correction in the market; even without the government’s intervention, firms can adjust their bargaining power to improve social welfare to a certain extent.