Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tpb.2007.12.005
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发表时间：
2008-05-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Akiyama, Eizo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Suzuki, Shinsuke;Akiyama, Eizo
间接互惠被认为是解释同一个人仅互动几次的情况下合作演变的关键机制。在间接互惠下，帮助他人的个人会从了解其良好声誉的其他人那里间接获得回报。最近，许多研究讨论了仅基于他人先前行为（一阶信息）的声誉标准和基于他人对手先前声誉（二阶信息）的声誉标准对间接互惠演化的影响。在本研究中，我们研究了间接互惠策略（判别策略：DIS）的进化稳定性，该策略仅与具有良好声誉的对手合作，在 n（> 2）人游戏中，其中超过两个人参与单个群体（交互）。我们证明，在多人博弈中，即使在图像评分声誉标准下，DIS 也是一种进化稳定策略（ESS），该标准仅基于一阶信息，并且合作（背叛）被判断为好（坏）。此结果与 2 人游戏的结果形成对比，在 2 人游戏中，根据仅基于一阶信息的声誉标准，DIS 不是 ESS。 (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. 保留所有权利。
Indirect reciprocity is considered as a key mechanism for explaining the evolution of cooperation in situations where the same individuals interact only a few times. Under indirect reciprocity, an individual who helps others gets returns indirectly from others who know her good reputation. Recently, many studies have discussed the effect of reputation criteria based only on the former actions of the others (first-order information) and of those based also on the former reputation of opponents of the others (second-order information) on the evolution of indirect reciprocity. In this study, we investigate the evolutionary stability of the indirectly reciprocal strategy (discriminating strategy: DIS), which cooperates only with opponents who have good reputations, in n (> 2)-person games where more than two individuals take part in a single group (interaction). We show that in n-person games, DIS is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) even under the image-scoring reputation criterion, which is based only on first-order information and where cooperations (defections) are judged to be good (bad). This result is in contrast to that of 2-person games where DIS is not an ESS under reputation criteria based only on first-order information. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.