Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining
Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00029.x
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发表时间：
2004-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Cai;Walter A. Cont
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Cai;Walter A. Cont
在（单方面）委托议价的背景下，我们分析了委托人（卖方）应该如何设计委托合同，以便为她的代理人（中介）提供适当的激励，并获得针对第三方（买方）的战略优势。我们考虑了在委托关系中同时存在道德风险和逆向选择问题的情况，以及卖方试图通过强加最低价格来获得战略优势，高于这个最低价格，她向委托支付佣金。研究表明，激励和承诺是相互替代的。低类型代理在与买方交易时被赋予较少的自由裁量权和较弱的激励，而高类型代理被赋予较多的自由裁量权和较强的激励。
In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives.