The Shapley value: Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: an application of the Shapley value
The Shapley value: Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: an application of the Shapley value
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沙普利值:参与者和联盟之间联系的内生形成:沙普利值的应用
DOI:
10.1017/cbo9780511528446.013
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发表时间:
1988
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
R. Myerson
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Aumann;R. Myerson
Consider the coalitional game v on the player set (1,2,3) defined by $$ v(S) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 0\quad if{\kern 1pt} \left| S \right| = 1, \\ 60\quad if{\kern 1pt} \left| S \right| = 2, \\ 72\quad if{\kern 1pt} \left| S \right| = 3, \\ \end{array} \right. $$ were |S| denotes the number of players inS. Most cooperative solution concepts “predict” (or assume) that the all-player coalition {1, 2, 3} will form and divide the payoff 72 in some appropriate way. Now suppose thatP1(player 1) andP2happen to meet each other in the absence of P3. There is little doubt that they would quickly seize the opportunity to form the coalition {1, 2} and collect a payoff of 30 each. This would happen in spite of its inefficiency. The reason is that if PiandP2were to inviteP3to join the negotiations, then the three players would find themselves in effectively symmetric roles, and the expected outcome would be {24,24,24}. P1andP2would not want to risk offering, say, 4 toP3(and dividing the remaining 68 among themselves), because they would realize that onceP3is invited to participate in the negotiations, the situation turns “wide open” — anything can happen.