Minimum wage competition
Minimum wage competition
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DOI：
10.1007/s10797-020-09603-8
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发表时间：
2019-09
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Koichi Fukumura;Atsushi Yamagishi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Koichi Fukumura;Atsushi Yamagishi
这篇论文表明，与其他研究表明的相反，要素流动性的增加可能会导致最低工资设置中的“争先恐后”。通过关注地域劳动力流动，我们提出了一个最低工资竞争模型，并证明了在流动性显著增加后，最低工资水平可能会提高，因为它允许每个政府较少地内部化最低工资提高的负面影响。这一结果与欧盟大规模扩张时期欧洲国家的数据是一致的。我们还发现，当(1)流动工人面临明显更糟糕的劳动力市场条件，(2)对经济效率的担忧较小，以及(3)流动工人所占份额相对较小时，最低工资水平对地理流动性的增加做出了正向反应。该模型还产生了一种规范性含义，即需要在制定最低工资方面进行协调，以实现理想的结果。
This paper shows that increased factor mobility might cause the “race to the top” in minimum wage settings, contrary to what other studies have suggested. By focusing on geographical labor mobility, we propose a minimum wage competition model and show that minimum wage rates may increase after a significant increase in mobility because it allows each government to less internalize the negative effect of the minimum wage increase. This result is consistent with the data on European countries from the period of EU’s massive enlargement. We also show that minimum wage rates respond positively to increased geographical mobility when (1) mobile workers face significantly worse labor market conditions, (2) the concerns of economic efficiency are small, and (3) the share of mobile workers is relatively small. The model also yields a normative implication that coordination in setting minimum wages is needed to achieve a desirable outcome.