Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions
Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions
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工资分配的比较政治经济学：党派之争和劳动力市场制度的作用
DOI：
10.1017/s000712340200011x
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Christopher R. Way
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jonas Pontusson;David Rueda;Christopher R. Way
通过对1973年至1995年16个经合组织国家工资不平等决定因素的汇总横截面时间序列分析，我们探讨了政治制度变量如何影响工资分配的上半部和下半部。我们的回归结果表明，工会化、工资谈判的集中化和公共部门就业主要通过提高非熟练工人的相对地位来影响工资分配，而左翼政府的平均主义效应作用于工资等级的上端，阻碍了高收入工人的工资增长。进一步的分析表明，政府党派关系的不同影响取决于工资谈判的集中化：在分散的谈判系统中，左翼政府与工资分配的两边都受到压缩有关。
Through a pooled cross-section time-series analysis of the determinants of wage inequality in sixteen OECD countries from 1973 to 1995, we explore how political-institutional variables affect the upper and lower halves of the wage distribution. Our regression results indicate that unionization, centralization of wage bargaining and public-sector employment primarily affect the distribution of wages by boosting the relative position of unskilled workers, while the egalitarian effects of Left government operate at the upper end of the wage hierarchy, holding back the wage growth of well-paid workers. Further analysis shows that the differential effects of government partisanship are contingent on wage-bargaining centralization: in decentralized bargaining systems, Left government is associated with compression of both halves of the wage distribution.