Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit
Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit
复制标题
买家和卖家佣金对拍卖行利润的中立性
DOI：
10.1002/mde.3225
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Yusuke Zennyo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toshihiro Tsuchihashi;Yusuke Zennyo
本文研究了垄断拍卖行的最优收益管理问题，其中卖方通过第二价格拍卖出售货物。该公司向买卖双方收取佣金。结果表明，存在一个连续的最优买方和卖方佣金率的组合，所有这些都产生相同的预期利润的房子。此外，我们讨论了几个可能的因素，导致普遍的习惯，零买家佣金，如佣金厌恶的买家，房子的激励，以最大限度地提高锤击价格，卖方和买方的偏好明显降低佣金率。
This paper presents an examination of optimal revenue management of a monopoly auction house through which a seller sells goods via a second‐price auction. The house charges commissions to both the buyer and seller. Results demonstrate that a continuum of combinations of optimal buyer and seller commission rates exists, all of which yield the same expected profit of the house. Additionally, we discuss several possible factors that lead to the prevailing custom of zero buyer commission, such as commission aversion of buyers, the house's incentive to maximize the hammer price, and seller and buyer preferences for apparently lowered commission rates.