Fiscal Policy at the Zero Lower Bound without Rational Expectations
Fiscal Policy at the Zero Lower Bound without Rational Expectations
复制标题
没有理性预期的零下限财政政策
DOI：
10.3386/w29134
复制
发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
João Guerreiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Riccardo Bianchi Vimercati;M. Eichenbaum;João Guerreiro
我们解决的问题是，ZLB的财政政策力量对理性预期的假设有多敏感。我们通过标准的NK模型的镜头来做到这一点，在这个模型中，人们是k级思考者。我们的分析削弱了在ZLB约束时使用政府支出来稳定经济的理由。人们越不老练，政府支出乘数的规模就越小。我们的分析强化了在ZLB具有约束力时使用税收政策来稳定产出的理由。在代理人没有理性预期的情况下，税收政策在ZLB期内稳定经济的力量基本不减。最后，我们发现，税收政策的沟通方式对其有效性至关重要。∗我们感谢本斯·巴多齐、劳伦斯·克里斯蒂亚诺、本杰明·约翰森、吉多·洛伦佐尼、普亚·莫拉维、马修·罗恩利、米格尔·桑塔纳、托马斯·萨金特、佩德罗·特勒斯和迈克尔·伍德福德的有益评论。我们还感谢乔治-马里奥斯·安吉莱托斯和约翰·莱希进行了出色的讨论，帮助改进了论文。西北大学；†@u.Northwestern.edu。‡西北大学和NBER；eich@northwestern.edu§西北大学；jguerreiro@u.Northwestern.edu。
We address the question of how sensitive is the power of fiscal policy in the ZLB to the assumption of rational expectations. We do so through the lens of a standard NK model in which people are level-k thinkers. Our analysis weakens the case for using government spending to stabilize the economy when the ZLB binds. The less sophisticated people are, the smaller is the size of the government-spending multiplier. Our analysis strengthens the case for using tax policy to stabilize output when the ZLB is binding. The power of tax policy to stabilize the economy during the ZLB period is essentially undiminished when agents do not have rational expectations. Finally, we show that the way in which tax policy is communicated is critical to its effectiveness. ∗We thank Bence Bardóczy, Lawrence Christiano, Benjamin Johannsen, Guido Lorenzoni, Pooya Molavi, Matthew Rognlie, Miguel Santana, Thomas Sargent, Pedro Teles and Michael Woodford for helpful comments. We also thank George-Marios Angeletos and John Leahy for excellent discussions that helped improve the paper. †Northwestern University; rbianchiv@u.northwestern.edu. ‡Northwestern University and NBER; eich@northwestern.edu. §Northwestern University; jguerreiro@u.northwestern.edu.