Commitment Issues in Budgeting
Commitment Issues in Budgeting
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预算中的承诺问题
DOI：
10.2307/2491365
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
K. Sivaramakrishnan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anil Arya;Jonathan C. Glover;K. Sivaramakrishnan
Antle和Fellingham [1995]研究了预算环境中的信息系统设计，其中中心（委托人）有能力（事先）承诺将收集（跟踪）哪些信息以及将使用跟踪信息的方式。1在关于Antle-Fellingham模型的本说明中，我们假设委托人的承诺权力有限;他可以承诺将跟踪哪些信息，但不能承诺如何使用这些信息。Antle和Fellingham发现，安装一个公共信息系统，减少代理人的信息优势，有时使代理人更好，更多的公共信息有时会降低生产效率。然而，在他们的模型中，委托人总是喜欢更多（更精细）的公共信息，而不是更少（更粗糙）的公共信息。这种偏好是由假定的无限能力来承诺如何使用跟踪的信息所驱动的。当事人可以并且确实承诺以事后而非其本人的方式使用信息
Antle and Fellingham [1995] study information system design in a budgeting setting in which the center (principal) has the ability to (ex ante) commit to both what information will be gathered (tracked) and the way in which the tracked information will be used.1 In this note on the Antle-Fellingham model, we assume the principal has limited powers of commitment; he can commit to what information will be tracked but not how it will be used. Antle and Fellingham find that installing a public information system that reduces the agent's informational advantage sometimes makes the agent better off, and that more public information sometimes decreases productive efficiency. However, in their model, the principal always prefers more (finer) public information to less (coarser) public information. This preference is driven by the assumed unlimited ability to commit to how the tracked information will be used. The principal can and does commit to using information in a manner that is ex post not in his own