Who Are You? Secure Identities in Ad Hoc Networks
Who Are You? Secure Identities in Ad Hoc Networks
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你是谁？
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-662-45174-8_16
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chaodong Zheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Seth Gilbert;Calvin C. Newport;Chaodong Zheng
当恶意用户创建多个假身份以获得优于诚实用户的优势时，就会发生虚假身份攻击。无线自组织网络特别容易受到这些攻击，因为参与者事先不知道，而且它们使用开放和共享的通信媒介。在本文中，我们开发了利用无线电资源测试策略在多通道无线自组织网络中阻止sybil攻击的算法。特别是，我们描述和分析了新的反sybil算法，这些算法高概率地保证每个诚实设备接受一组可信且不可伪造的身份，其中包括所有其他诚实设备和有限数量的假（sybil）身份。所提出的算法在时间复杂度和符号界限之间提供了折衷。我们还注意到，这些算法作为子程序解决了匿名无线设置中独立感兴趣的两个问题：拜占庭共识和网络大小估计。
Sybil attacks occur when malicious users create multiple fake identities to gain an advantage over honest users. Wireless ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to these attacks because the participants are not known in advance, and they use an open and shared communication medium. In this paper, we develop algorithms that thwart sybil attacks in multi-channel wireless ad hoc networks using radio resource testing strategies. In particular, we describe and analyze new anti-sybil algorithms that guarantee, with high probability, that each honest device accepts a set of trusted and unforgeable identities that include all other honest devices and a bounded number of fake (sybil) identities. The proposed algorithms provide trade-offs between time complexity and sybil bounds. We also note that these algorithms solve, as subroutines, two problems of independent interest in this anonymous wireless setting: Byzantine consensus and network size estimation.