Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding
Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding
复制标题
测试独立司法机构对民主倒退可能性的影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Randazzo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Douglas M. Gibler;K. Randazzo
我们检验司法独立在防止政权转向威权主义方面的功效。利用163个不同国家1960年至2000年的司法约束数据集，我们发现，在所有类型的国家中，建立独立的司法机构可以防止政权向威权主义转变。既有法院也有能力阻止非民主国家的政权崩溃。这些结果为证实司法部门维持政权稳定的能力提供了第一批重要证据。然而，不幸的是，法院系统的有益影响似乎需要时间来发展。证据表明，无论是民主国家还是非民主国家，新成立的法院都与政权崩溃呈正相关。
We test the efficacy of judicial independence in preventing regime reversals toward authoritarianism. Using a dataset of judicial constraints across 163 different countries from 1960 to 2000, we find that established independent judiciaries prevent regime changes toward authoritarianism across all types of states. Established courts are also capable of thwarting regime collapses in nondemocracies. These results provide some of the first large-n evidence confirming the ability of the judiciary to maintain regime stability. Unfortunately, however, the beneficial effects of court systems seem to take time to develop. The evidence indicates that newly formed courts are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies.