Research for Sale: Determinants and Consequences of Paid-for Analyst Research
Research for Sale: Determinants and Consequences of Paid-for Analyst Research
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1265709
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发表时间：
2010-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Marcus P. Kirk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Marcus P. Kirk
我使用1999-2006年期间手工收集的付费报告样本来检验付费保险的决定因素和市场影响。自1999年以来，已有500多家美国上市公司为分析师的报道付费。然而，人们对这项分析师研究的信息后果知之甚少。不确定性更大、信息环境较弱、营业额较低的公司更有可能购买保险，因为它们从分析师的报道中获益最大，但不太可能吸引卖方分析师。尽管存在内在的利益冲突，但我发现付费报告基于两天的异常回报为投资者提供了信息内容。在开始覆盖后，公司经历了机构所有权、卖方分析师追随者和流动性的增加。此外，对于这家收费研究公司来说，结果是最好的，它的事前政策减少了潜在的利益冲突。
I examine the determinants and market impact of paid-for coverage using a hand-collected sample of paid-for reports over 1999-2006. More than five hundred publicly listed US companies paid for analyst coverage since 1999. Yet little is known about the informational consequences of this analyst research. Firms with greater uncertainty, weaker information environments, and low turnover are more likely to buy coverage as they have the most to gain from analyst coverage but are unlikely to attract sell-side analysts. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest, I find paid-for reports have information content for investors based on 2-day abnormal returns. After the initiation of coverage, companies experience an increase in institutional ownership, sell-side analyst following, and liquidity. In addition, the results are strongest for the fee-based research firm with ex ante policies that reduce potential conflicts of interest.