Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting
Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting
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长期股东和分阶段投票
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
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通讯作者：
J. Barry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lynne L. Dallas;J. Barry
我们探讨了分阶段投票（“TPV”），这是一种长期股东比短期股东获得更多每股投票权的安排。冠捷科技近年来作为一种被认为是企业短视的补救措施而获得了关注。我们开始与理论，定位冠捷相对于其他公司的投票结构，如一股一票和双层股票。通过减少短期股东的影响力，冠捷可能会鼓励管理人员以公司的长期利益行事。它还可以通过使控股股东（通常是长期股东）能够以较低的所有权水平维持其控制权，促进控股股东多元化和公司股票发行。在这方面，它类似于一个温和的形式的双级股票，但更有针对性的短视行为。然后，我们调查了美国公司在实践中使用冠捷的经验。由于TPV在美国的经验有限，从统计学角度来看，我们的样本量较小。然而，我们的研究结果与我们的理论分析是一致的。我们的所有权和投票数据表明，冠捷科技赋予长期股东权力，但它对鼓励长期持股几乎没有作用;这可能是由于投资者对少数拥有冠捷科技的公司缺乏认识。在短期内，冠捷授权内部人士，增加他们的控制权，并在他们对公司的所有权和控制权之间建立一个楔子（尽管这个楔子比典型的双重股权公司要小）。然而，从长期来看，我们发现冠捷与内部人所有权和控制权的减少有关。我们看到冠捷科技的公司，主要是成熟的家族企业，从集中的所有权结构向更分散的所有权结构过渡。与此相关，我们发现冠捷科技与显著的内部人多元化和增发股票有关。总体而言，冠捷科技公司的表现明显优于整个市场;一个在1980年投资冠捷科技公司指数的投资者，到2013年底的资金将是投资标准普尔500指数的投资者的6倍多。虽然目前尚不清楚冠捷的强劲表现是否与冠捷有关，但我们认为，股东和公司应该自由地尝试合理的冠捷计划，如果他们愿意的话。http://ssrn.com/abstract=2746638
We explore Time-Phased Voting (“TPV”), an arrangement in which long-term shareholders receive more votes per share than short-term shareholders. TPV has gained prominence in recent years as a proposed remedy for perceived corporate myopia. We begin with theory, situating TPV relative to other corporate voting structures such as one-share-one-vote and dual-class stock. By decreasing the influence of short-term shareholders, TPV may encourage managers to act in the long-term interests of their firms. It may also facilitate controlling shareholder diversification and firm equity issuances by enabling controlling shareholders, who are generally long-term shareholders, to maintain their control with lower levels of ownership. In this respect, it resembles a milder form of dual-class stock, but is more targeted toward myopic behavior. We then investigate U.S. companies’ experiences with TPV in practice. Due to limited U.S. experience with TPV, our sample size is small from a statistical standpoint. Nevertheless, our findings are consistent with our theoretical analysis. Our ownership and voting data suggest that TPV empowers long-term shareholders, but that it does little to encourage long-term shareholding; this may be due to a lack of investor awareness regarding the few companies that have TPV. In the short term, TPV empowers insiders, increasing their control and creating a wedge between their ownership and control of the firm (though a smaller wedge than is typical of dual-class firms). However, in the long term we find that TPV is associated with reduced insider ownership and control. We see a transition in TPV companies, which are mainly mature, family-owned companies, from a concentrated to a more dispersed ownership structure. Relatedly, we find that TPV is associated with significant insider diversification and the issuance of additional equity. Overall, TPV firms significantly outperformed the market as a whole; an investor who invested in our TPV firm index in 1980 would have more than six times as much money at the end of 2013 as an investor who invested in the S&P 500. While it is not clear that TPV contributed to this strong performance, we believe that shareholders and corporations should be free to experiment with reasonable TPV plans if they so choose.The appendix to this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2746638.