Price Discrimination and Sequential Contracting in Monopolistic Input Markets
Price Discrimination and Sequential Contracting in Monopolistic Input Markets
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垄断投入市场中的价格歧视和顺序承包
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2361092
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Seung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hyunchul Kim;Seung
本文研究了在垄断供应商与不对称下游零售商签订合同的中间产品市场中禁止价格歧视的福利含义。我们证明，无论价格歧视是否被禁止，供应商都有强烈的动机通过顺序承包来操纵相互依存的需求结构，并且当供应商实施顺序承包时，允许价格歧视可以改善社会福利和消费者剩余。
This paper examines the welfare implication of banning price discrimination in the intermediate goods market in which a monopolistic supplier contracts with asymmetric downstream retailers. We demonstrate that the supplier has a strong incentive to manipulate the interdependent demand structure through sequential contracting whether price discrimination is banned or not, and allowing price discrimination improves social welfare and consumer surplus when sequential contracting is implemented by the supplier.